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9Abstract : We consider situations in which individuals would like to choose an action which
is close to that of others, as well as close to a state of nature, with the ideal proximity to the state
varying across agents. Before this coordination game is played, a cheap-talk communication stage
is oﬀered to the individuals who decide to whom they reveal their private information about the
state. The information transmission occurring in the communication stage is characterized by a
strategic communication network. We provide an explicit link between players’ preferences and the
equilibrium strategic communication networks. A key feature of our equilibrium characterization
is that whether communication takes place between two agents not only depends on the conﬂict
of interest between these agents, but also on the number and preferences of the other agents with
whom they communicate. Apart from some speciﬁc cases, the equilibrium communication networks
are quite complex despite our simple one-dimensional description of preference heterogeneity. In
general, strategic communication networks cannot be completely Pareto-ranked, but expected social
welfare always increases as the communication network expands.
R´ esum´ e : Cet article ´ etudie des situations strat´ egiques dans lesquelles chaque individu cherche
` a choisir une action ` a la fois proche des actions choisies par les autres individus et proche d’un ´ etat
de la nature, la proximit´ e id´ eale ` a cet ´ etat variant entre les agents. Avant que ce jeu de coordination
soit jou´ e, une ´ etape de communication gratuite est oﬀerte aux individus qui peuvent alors d´ ecider ` a
qui ils r´ ev` elent les informations priv´ ees qu’ils d´ etiennent sur l’´ etat. La transmission d’information
qui a lieu au cours de l’´ etape de communication est caract´ eris´ ee par un r´ eseau de communication
strat´ egique. Nous caract´ erisons explicitement les r´ eseaux de communication strat´ egique qui peuvent
´ emerger ` a l’´ equilibre en fonction des pr´ ef´ erences des joueurs. Le fait que deux agents communiquent
d´ epend non seulement de leur conﬂit d’int´ erˆ ets mais ´ egalement du nombre et des pr´ ef´ erences des
autres individus avec lesquels ils communiquent. En dehors de cas sp´ eciﬁques, les r´ eseaux de
communication d’´ equilibre ont une structure complexe malgr´ e la description uni-dimensionnelle de
l’h´ et´ erog´ en´ eit´ e des pr´ ef´ erences. En g´ en´ eral, les r´ eseaux de communication strat´ egique ne peuvent
pas ˆ etre compl` etement ordonn´ es au sens de Pareto, mais le bien ˆ etre social esp´ er´ e augmente toujours
lorsque le r´ eseau de communication s’agrandit.
Keywords: Cheap talk, coordination, incomplete information, networks.
JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83, D85.
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Many economic interactions involve agents who make decisions that are coordinated with those of
others, but who have heterogeneous preferences and incomplete information about the appropriate
decision. For instance, diﬀerent privately-informed divisions of an organization have to coordinate
their actions to maximize the ﬁrm’s proﬁt, but each division may be biased in its choice because
of career concerns, eﬀort aversion or local adaptation costs.1 Similarly, in a market, ﬁrms take
decisions that are the best suited to the ﬁrms’ characteristics and the underlying fundamentals,
but which may also have a “beauty contest” coordination aspect arising from the strategic com-
plementarities in their actions. Another example is ﬁnancial analysts who have, ﬁrst, an interest
in making predictions that are similar to those of others and, second, heterogeneous preferences
towards such announcements.2 Finally, members of a political party are interested in the cohesion
of the party, so they advocate the policy that is most in line with that preferred by others and
appropriate to the uncertain environment, but at the same time activists may diﬀer in their policy
preferences.3
In such situations, the objective of this paper is to analyze how agents strategically share
the signals they privately hold about the fundamentals. We consider a coordination game with
incomplete information in which players can decide to whom they send costless, non-veriﬁable,
and possibly diﬀerent messages about their private information before taking their payoﬀ-relevant
actions. Each player incurs quadratic losses from the mismatch between his one-dimensional action
and both others’ actions and his own “ideal action”. Every player’s ideal action depends on the
underlying fundamentals and on a systematic positive or negative bias, as in the cheap-talk or
delegation models of Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Dessein (2002). These biases vary between
individuals, and the proﬁle of biases in the population is a measure of the conﬂict of interest
that agents face. We focus on the way in which players’ heterogeneity in ideal actions aﬀects the
decentralized and strategic communication between them. We provide a complete characterization
of equilibrium communication which roughly boils down to the intuitive statement that agents
are more prone to communicate as their ideal actions are closer to each other. For instance, an
equilibrium always exists in which players with the same preferences communicate with each other.
The same idea is illustrated by the result that, for every agent, strategic communication with agents
who are distant in term of their ideal actions also implies strategic communication with agents who
are closer in that respect.
Within our stylized framework, we characterize information transmission between players by a
strategic communication network, in the sense that a connection is formed from one individual to
another if the former truthfully transmits his private information to the latter. We obtain an ex-
plicit and tractable result regarding the relationship between players’ preference heterogeneity and
the equilibrium strategic communication networks, depending on the strength of the coordination
motive and the prior information structure. The originality of our approach in modelling commu-
nication networks lies in the fact that whether a communication link is formed between two agents
is entirely driven by strategic concerns and conﬂicts of interest between players. That is, players’
1A multi-divisional organization in which decisions must be adapted to local conditions and information but also
coordinated between divisions is considered in Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008) and Rantakari (2008).
2Desgranges and Rochon (2007) develop this example.
3See, for example, Dewan and Myatt (2008).
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9beneﬁts from informing or being informed during the communication stage are endogenously de-
termined by the equilibrium outcome of the decision stage. In contrast, in most economic models
of non-cooperative network formation, starting with Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the creation
of links is driven by the exogenous costs and beneﬁts of direct and indirect connections between
individuals.4
Our equilibrium is characterized as follows. A communication network is described by a set
of receivers for each player, where a player is said to be a receiver of another player if the latter
reveals his private information to the former. Informational incentive constraints require that no
player has an interest in lying about his type to his (endogenous) set of receivers. As in standard
cheap-talk games (e.g., Crawford and Sobel, 1982), this condition can be formulated as a condition
on the proximity between the sender’s and receivers’ biases, but our incentive constraints are more
sophisticated than is typical in such games: a key feature of our model is that the existence of
communication between two agents depends not only on the conﬂict of interest between them,
but also on their conﬂicts of interest regarding the other agents with whom they communicate.
First, given our quadratic payoﬀ functions, what matters for the sender’s incentive constraint is
the average bias of the receivers. It follows that a large bias for one receiver may relax the sender’s
incentive constraint when the other receivers have a lower bias than the sender. Second, the sender
can lie about his type to any subset of receivers. When some of the players in the receiver set have
signiﬁcantly smaller (larger, resp.) bias than the sender, the latter has an incentive to over-report
(under-report, resp.) his type to these players only in order to increase (decrease, resp.) their
expectations about the state. This in turn increases (decreases, resp.) these receivers’ actions,
so that the sender can increase (decrease, resp.) his own action which is consequently closer to
his ideal point while still coordinated with these receivers’ actions. To sum up, our informational
incentive constraints require that the sender’s bias be close enough to the average bias of every
subset of the receiver set.
Lying to a subset of the receivers also creates coordination costs for the sender because the
actions of the players he lies to will not be coordinated with those of the other players. This
generates what we call a mutual discipline eﬀect of coordination, illustrating that the need for
players’ actions to be coordinated facilitates information revelation. As the set of receivers of a given
sender increases, the incentive constraints with respect to some strict subsets of receivers weaken.
Hence, when the informational incentive constraints are satisﬁed for information transmission to a
set of receivers, the same constraints are not necessarily satisﬁed for information transmission to a
strict subset of these receivers. In particular, there may exist an equilibrium in which an individual
reveals his type to a group of receivers whereas there is no equilibrium in which he reveals his type
to only one member of this group. This also implies that when players are arranged in groups with
the same preferences, they tend to communicate more easily to members of other groups as the
size of their own group increases.
In general, the structure of the set of equilibrium communication networks is quite complex,
and rich insights emerge despite our simple one-dimensional description of preference heterogene-
ity. One general feature of our model is the multiplicity of equilibrium networks, as is common in
communication games, with the additional interesting feature that maximal strategic communica-
tion networks are not necessarily unique and cannot be completely Pareto-ranked. That is, there
4See Jackson (2007) for an extensive survey of such models.
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9may be an equilibrium in which player 1 transmits his information to players 2 and 3, another
equilibrium in which player 1 transmits his information to players 2 and 4, but no equilibrium in
which player 1 transmits his information to players 2, 3 and 4, with player 3 being better oﬀ in
the ﬁrst equilibrium and player 4 better oﬀ in the second. We show, however, that expected social
welfare always rises as the communication network expands, which results when players’ conﬂicts
of interests are reduced. Our equilibrium characterization directly provides necessary and suﬃcient
conditions regarding these conﬂicts for the complete social-welfare maximizing network to be an
equilibrium of the communication game.
After characterizing equilibrium communication networks in general, we turn to particular
distributions of biases. For example, when biases are uniformly distributed, a player’s tendency to
communicate always increases with the proximity of his bias to the average bias in the population.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2, and the welfare compar-
ison of communication networks is carried out in Section 3. Equilibrium communication networks
are analyzed in Section 4, and Section 5 focuses on equilibria in which communication is maximal
and examines particular distributions of biases. Section 6 concludes and discusses some related
literature. Most of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 A Class of Coordination Games with Incomplete Information
Let N = {1,...,n} be a ﬁnite set of agents, with n ≥ 2. Each agent chooses an action ai ∈ Ai = R.
The action proﬁle is denoted a = (a1,...,an). Each agent’s payoﬀ depends on the action proﬁle and
a state of nature θ. Before the game starts, nobody knows the state of nature, but each agent i ∈ N
receives a private signal si ∈ Si = {si,si} about θ, where si < si. We assume that agents’ types
are independent and denote by qi ∈ ∆(Si) the prior probability distribution over agent i’s set of
types, for every i ∈ N. When the type proﬁle is s = (s1,...,sn), the underlying state of nature is
θ(s) ∈ R.
To obtain explicit and tractable equilibrium characterizations, we assume that the state of na-
ture is additive in types: θ(s) =
 
i∈N si.5 The diﬀerence between the two possible signals of
player i, si−si, can then be interpreted as the value of private information for player i. When this
value is relatively high, player i’s private information has a considerable impact on the fundamen-
tals.
Agent i’s payoﬀ function is given by








5This is a standard simplifying assumption in common-value environments, especially in auction theory (see,
amongst many others, Bulow and Klemperer, 2002, Mares and Harstad, 2003 and Levin, 2004). Note that the state
in our model can be any weighted sum of players’ types (since we do not make any assumptions about the two possible
values of each signal), and players’ signals are not assumed to be i.i.d. (they are only assumed to be independent).
The weighted sum of players’ private signals is a good approximation of the payoﬀ-relevant state in many situations.
In an organizational setting, a signal si for division i may represent division i’s time, budget or expected beneﬁt from
a joint project (which is private information), and the payoﬀ-relevant state that matters for the whole organization
may be the total time, budget or expected beneﬁt of the project.
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9The ﬁrst component of agent i’s utility function is a quadratic loss in the distance between his
action ai and his ideal action θ(s)+ bi. The second component is a miscoordination quadratic loss
which increases in the average distance between i’s action and other agents’ actions. The constant
α ∈ (0,1) weights both sources of quadratic loss, i.e. it parameterizes agents’ coordination motives
arising from the strategic complementarity in their actions. The constant bi ∈ R parameterizes
agent i’s preferences over his ideal action in the ﬁrst component of his utility function. We allow
this bias parameter bi to vary across individuals to reﬂect agents’ conﬂicts of interest with respect to
their ideal actions. Were all bi to be equal, there would be no informational incentive problem, and
strategic information transmission would therefore be trivial. We assume without loss of generality
that players are indexed in increasing order of their biases: b1 ≤     ≤ bn.
The quadratic formulation of players’ utility functions, together with the independence of play-
ers’ types, will allow us to obtain a unique and tractable solution for this Bayesian game whatever
the information structure generated by the communication stage (see Subsection 2.3).
2.2 Communication Game
Before the coordination game described below is played, but after each player has learnt his type,
a communication stage is introduced in which players can send costless and private messages to
each other. More precisely, every player i can send a diﬀerent message m
j
i ∈ Mi to every other
player j  = i, with Mi denoting the (non-empty) set of messages available to player i. Let mi =
(m
j
i)j =i ∈ (Mi)n−1 be the vector of messages sent by player i, and mi = (mi
j)j =i ∈
 
j =iMj ≡ M−i
the vector of messages received by player i.











i | si) be the probability (0 or 1) that player i sends the message m
j
i to player j according
to his strategy σi when his type is si.
Player i’s second-stage decision strategy is a mapping
τi : Si × (Mi)n−1 × M−i → Ai,
where τi(si,mi,mi) is the action chosen by player i when his type is si ∈ Si, the vector of private
messages mi = (m
j
i)j =i ∈ (Mi)n−1 was sent, and the vector of private messages mi = (mi
j)j =i ∈ M−i
was received. Let τ(s,(mi)i∈N) = (τi(si,mi,mi))i∈N be the corresponding action proﬁle.
A Nash equilibrium7 of the communication game is a strategy proﬁle (σ,τ) = ((σi)i∈N,(τi)i∈N)
6For simplicity, we restrict the analysis to pure-strategy equilibria. While we do not exclude the existence of
mixed equilibria, as in the discrete quadratic version of Crawford and Sobel (1982), the full characterization of
such equilibria would be quite diﬃcult since we have to consider the possibility that any combination of players
randomize over their messages, for any possible combination of receivers. More importantly, the partial transmission
of information generated by random strategies would not allow us to identify the equilibrium as a communication
network. We would need to instead consider weighted networks, where each link between two players is weighted
according to the quantity of information revealed between the two players. For the same tractability reason, we only
consider two possible types for each player.
7Note that, in our communication game, this deﬁnition yields the same equilibrium outcomes as does the perfect
Bayesian Nash equilibrium deﬁnition.
6








































9satisfying the following properties:
(i) For all i ∈ N, and si ∈ Si,
(σ
j










(ii) For all i ∈ N, mi ∈ (Mi)n−1 and mi ∈ supp[σi
−i],

























We will characterize the information-transmission networks that emerge from the cheap-talk
extension of the game as (directed) graphs over the set of players. Since we consider only pure
strategies and two possible types for each player, any message from player i to player j is either
fully revealing or non-revealing, and a communication link is said to be formed from i to j when
i’s message to j is fully revealing. Without loss of generality, we consider binary message spaces,
Mi = {m,m}.
Every communication strategy proﬁle (σi)i∈N can be characterized by a communication network
(Ri)i∈N, where, for every player i,
Ri ≡ {j ∈ N\{i} : σ
j
i(si)  = σ
j
i(si)}
is the set of individuals to whom player i reveals his type. Let ri = |Ri| be the number of individuals
who learn player i’s type in the communication stage. Using the terminology of graph theory, Ri
corresponds to player i’s (out)neighborhood and ri to player i’s (out)degree.
2.3 Second-Stage Equilibrium Characterization
Given a proﬁle of types (si)i∈N and a communication strategy proﬁle characterized by (Ri)i∈N, the




α(n − 1 − rj)E(sj) + (1 − α)(n − 1)sj




E(sj) + Bi, (2)
where Ii = {k : i ∈ Rk} ∪ {i} is the set of signals which are known by player i after the communi-
cation stage, Ii = {k : i  ∈ Rk}\{i} is the set of signals which are not known by player i after the
communication stage, and
Bi =
[(n − 1) − (n − 2)α]bi + α
 
j =i bj
n + α − 1
. (3)
Player i’s optimal action thus has three components. The ﬁrst is a weighted sum of j’s actual
7








































9type, sj, and the expected value of j’s type, E(sj), for each player j whose type is known by player i
(including himself). A greater weight is put on the actual type of player j as the coordination
motive, α, is lower and as the number of players who know j’s type, rj, is higher. This is because
a player has a greater incentive to act according to his own private signal when coordination does
not matter much and when many other players act according to the same signal. The second
component corresponds to the sum of the expected values of j’s type for each player j whose type
is not known by player i. The last component adjusts the action of player i with respect to the bias
proﬁle. This increases in all players’ biases, with more weight being put on player i’s own bias, bi,
as the coordination motive decreases.
The unique and explicit characterization of second-stage equilibrium actions as a function of
the information structure and players’ preferences enables us to characterize unambiguously, and
in a tractable way, the eﬃcient and equilibrium communication strategy proﬁles, as shown in the
following sections.
3 Eﬃcient Communication Networks
Before characterizing the equilibrium networks of the communication game, we focus on the eﬃ-
ciency of communication networks. The following proposition compares players’ ex ante expected
payoﬀs as the communication network expands, assuming that equilibrium actions are played in
the second-stage game.8 While an increase in the set of receivers who learn player i’s type is always
strictly beneﬁcial for player i and for these receivers, this increase always makes players who do
not learn player i’s type strictly worse oﬀ. More precisely:
Proposition 1 Consider two communication networks R = (Ri,R−i) and R′ = (R′
i,R−i) such
that Ri   R′
i.
i) Player i is strictly better oﬀ, ex-ante, with the communication network R′ than with the
communication network R;
ii) Every player j ∈ R′
i (with j ∈ Ri or j / ∈ Ri) is strictly better oﬀ, ex-ante, with the
communication network R′ than with the communication network R;
iii) Every player j ∈ N\({i}∪R′
i) is strictly worse oﬀ, ex-ante, with the communication network
R′ than with the communication network R.
Proof. See Appendix 7.2.
The intuition of this result is the following. As in Crawford and Sobel (1982), players’ biases
enter into players’ ex ante expected utility in the same way whatever the information structure.
Given the quadratic formulation of the payoﬀs, the information structure aﬀects a player’s ex ante
expected utility through its eﬀect on the variance of the diﬀerence between his own action and
the real state, and the variance of the diﬀerence between his own action and others’ actions. By
revealing his type to other players, a player reduces the second variance (without aﬀecting the ﬁrst).
By obtaining information from other players, a player diminishes both variances. On the contrary,
the ﬁrst variance for a player in situation (iii) of Proposition 1, who is excluded from player i’s
8As in Crawford and Sobel (1982), it is not possible to compare players’ expected payoﬀs at the interim stage.
8








































9information ﬂow, remains unchanged but the second variance rises. This explains why this is the
only kind of player who is worse oﬀ under R′ than R.
The above proposition implies that, in general, communication networks cannot be completely
ranked in the sense of Pareto. In particular, deﬁning a communication network R′ = (R′
i)i∈N as
more informative than R = (Ri)i∈N if Ri ⊆ R′
i for every i ∈ N (with at least one strict inclusion), a
more-informative communication network does not Pareto dominate, in general, a less-informative
communication network. However, using Proposition 1 iteratively, we obtain that the complete
communication network (Ri = N\{i} for all i ∈ N) Pareto dominates every other communication
network.
The next proposition shows that, even if it can be harmful for some players, the overall social-
welfare eﬀect of enlarging the set of receivers of every player is always positive. Social welfare is
deﬁned as the sum of individual utilities: w(a;θ) =
 
i∈N ui(a;θ).
Proposition 2 If the communication networks R′ = (R′
i)i∈N and R = (Ri)i∈N are such that
r′
i ≥ ri for all i ∈ N, with at least one strict inequality, then welfare is always strictly higher, ex
ante, with the communication network R′ than with the communication network R.
Proof. See Appendix 7.3.
In particular, if a communication network R′ is more informative than R, then welfare is strictly
higher with R′ than with R.
4 Equilibrium Communication Networks
In this section we provide a full characterization of equilibrium communication networks as a
function of the parameters of the game, and derive a number of comparative-statics results. We
illustrate the characterization with a four-player example and show how our model generates a
mutual discipline eﬀect of coordination. Last, the general qualitative features of the equilibrium
sets of receivers are described.
4.1 Full Characterization
Our main proposition provides a full characterization of the communication networks that arise as
equilibrium outcomes of the cheap-talk extension of the game. In short, the proposition states that
a player will communicate with a group of players if his taste is not too diﬀerent from the average
taste of every subset of these players. More precisely, there exists an equilibrium network in which
player i’s set of receivers is Ri ⊆ N\{i} if and only if, for every subset of players in Ri, the average
bias of the players in the subset is close enough to player i’s own bias.
Proposition 3 There exists an equilibrium network in which player i’s set of receivers is Ri ⊆
N\{i} iﬀ for all R′
i ⊆ Ri we have
 
   








   
   
≤
(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − αr′
i)
2(n − 1)(n − 1 − αri)
(si − si). (4)
9








































9Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
This characterization reveals a remarkable insight of our model, which will be further analyzed
in the following sections: the incentive to communicate to a given receiver not only depends on the
conﬂict of interest between the sender and the receiver, but also on how the sender communicates
with the other players. However, each player’s equilibrium communication strategies do not depend
on other players’ actual communication strategies. This second property simpliﬁes our analysis
considerably. The intuition is as follows. Consider a strategy proﬁle in which some player (say,
player 1) reveals his type to players in R1, e.g. by sending them the message ¯ m when his type is
¯ s1 and the message m when his type is s1. This strategy is optimal if, whatever his type, player 1
has no incentive to send an incorrect message to some or all players in R1. Assume that player 1’s
type is ¯ s1 and consider a deviation in which player 1 reveals the incorrect message to all players
in R1 (the intuition is exactly the same when player 1’s type is s1 or when he deviates only for a
subset of the players in R1). This (unobservable) deviation is not proﬁtable if player 1’s expected
utility is no higher when he sends message m instead of message ¯ m. Player 1’s deviation to sending
message m instead of ¯ m when his type is ¯ s1 changes player 1’s expected utility by changing (i)
players’ actions in R1, from ¯ ai to ai, and (ii) player 1’s best reply to the actions of players in
R1. The change in actions of the players in R1 depends on the diﬀerence (¯ s1 − s1) independently
of what they learn about others’ types, as (¯ s1 − s1) enters separately into ¯ ai − ai. This clearly
depends on the (linear and additive) form of second-stage equilibrium actions, which results from
the speciﬁc utility functions we use. It also depends on the independence of players’ types,9 and
on the additivity of the state.10 Consequently, and again because payoﬀs are quadratic, player 1’s
best reply to other players’ actions and player 1’s expected utility are aﬀected by the change in the
actions of players in R1 independently of indirect communication links.11
Remark. Morgan and Stocken (2008) consider a model involving n “experts” (polled con-
stituents) with no action, who send messages about binary types to a policymaker. In their model,
the incentive for an expert to reveal truthfully his type depends on the communication strategies
of the other experts. While their model and ours are diﬃcult to compare, an important diﬀerence
concerns the assumptions regarding the information structure. In our model, types are assumed
9As an extreme example consider the situation in which some player j  = 1 is almost perfectly informed about
player 1’s type (i.e., s1 and sj are strongly correlated). Then, when players in R1 know player j’s signal (i.e., there is
a communication link between player j and (some) players in R1), the message of player 1 has only a limited impact
on players’ actions (and thus, on player 1’s expected payoﬀ), while if player j does not reveal his type to players in
R1, then player 1’s signal has a far stronger impact on players’ actions in R1.
10If the types do not enter separately into the state then the eﬀect on players’ actions ¯ ai − ai, for i in R1, would
also depend on other players’ types (consider, for example, a state θ that depends in a multiplicative way on players’
types). Note however that the independence property does not rely on the fact that each player has only two possible
types. Any deviation from a communication strategy over a larger type space would still generate changes in players’
actions that do not depend on indirect network connections. Also note that the resolution of the model would be
much more diﬃcult by introducing an additional heterogeneity concerning coordination motives (αi)i∈N, although
the intuition for the independence property would not be aﬀected.
11More precisely, without deviation each term in player 1’s expected utility, V1, takes the form E(X
2 | s1), where
X depends linearly on players’ actions, types and biases. When player 1 deviates, each term in player 1’s expected
utility, V
′
1, now takes the form E((X+ǫ)
2 | s1) where, as noted above, ǫ only depends on (¯ s1−s1) (and the exogenous
parameters of the game). In particular, ǫ does not depend on players’ knowledge in R1 about players other than
player 1. Hence, the sign of the diﬀerence V
′
1 − V1, which yields our equilibrium condition in Proposition 3 only
depends on the terms in the expression E((X + ǫ)
2 | s1) − E(X
2 | s1), and so on terms that take the following form:
ǫ
2 + 2ǫE(X | s1). Finally, E(X | s1) does not depend on indirect connections, since players’ expected (best-reply or
equilibrium) actions only depend on the expected values of types.
10








































9to be independent, and the state is an additive function of the types. In contrast, in Morgan and
Stocken (2008), players’ signals about the state are independent conditional on the state. As a
consequence, the change in the beliefs of the policymaker and the change in his decision depend on
the equilibrium communication strategies that are considered.
Thanks to the independence property and to the quadratic form of the payoﬀ functions, infor-
mational incentive constraints can be formulated independently for every player as conditions on
the proximity between the sender’s bias and the receivers’ average biases. When a player’s bias is
close to the average bias of the receivers, lying about his type creates strong miscoordination costs.
On the contrary, if the distance between the sender’s bias and the average bias of the receivers is
substantial, then the sender has an incentive to over-report or under-report his type so that others’
actions will be closer to his ideal action. Since the sender can lie about his type to any subset R′
i
of the set Ri of receivers, informational incentive constraints also require that the sender’s bias be
close enough to the average bias of every such subset R′
i ⊆ Ri. Exactly how close this should be
depends on the RHS of Equation (4) and the size of the subset R′
i. This will be discussed in more
detail below.
4.2 Comparative Statics
From Proposition 3 it is easy to derive the general eﬀects of the information structure and players’
preferences on equilibrium communication networks. More precisely:
Corollary 1 The equilibrium conditions for information transmission from any player i to any set
of receivers become weaker as:
(i) The value of private information, ¯ si − si, increases;
(ii) The weight on coordination motives, α, increases;
(iii) All biases are reduced by the same factor: (b1,...,bn)  → r(b1,...,bn), where r ∈ [0,1).









2 ≥ 0. Finally, reducing the absolute values of the biases as in (iii) clearly
decreases the LHS of Inequality (4).
The intuition for (ii) and (iii) is quite clear. As the coordination motive increases, or the biases
all become closer to each other, the conﬂict of interest between all players falls, so informational
incentive constraints become weaker. The intuition of (i) is also standard. When ¯ si − si is small,
a player’s inﬂuence on the receivers’ actions is also small so his incentive to lie about his type is
greater. In the extreme case in which ¯ si − si tends to zero, the incentive constraints of player i
would be similar to the condition for full revelation of information in a model with a continuum of
types, as in Crawford and Sobel (1982), which is never satisﬁed except when players’ preferences
exactly coincide.
The eﬀect of the size of the population, n, on communication networks is more diﬃcult to
analyze since it is not clear how the proﬁle of biases and the information structure will change
when players are added to the population. However, we can ﬁrst note that, for a given sender and
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9a given set of receivers, increasing the total number of players, n, strengthens the conditions on the
proximity between the sender’s and receivers’ biases, since the RHS of Equation (4) is decreasing
in n.12 The intuition of this eﬀect is similar to the intuition of (i) in the previous corollary: as the
total number of players rises, the inﬂuence of the actions of a ﬁxed set of receivers is smaller, so
the sender’s incentive to misrepresent his type is greater.
If we consider variations in the size of the population, a more natural form of the model would
probably be to describe the state as the average of players’ signals, instead of the sum (this is
irrelevant when n is ﬁxed, since we impose no restrictions on ¯ si and si). Equivalently, we can
replace each signal si of every player i by si
n. In this case, the RHS of Inequality (4) always tends
to zero as n increases, whatever the set of receivers, so that information transmission becomes
impossible between any pair of players who do not have the same preferences. This eﬀect is similar
to that observed by Morgan and Stocken (2008, Proposition 1) who show that truthful reporting
is never an equilibrium for a suﬃciently large sample of constituents.
4.3 A Four-player Example
As an illustration we consider a game with n = 4 players, α = 1/2, and assume that every player
has the same value of private information, given by si − si = 12×3
7 . The RHS of Equation (4) in
Proposition 3 simpliﬁes to 3
6−r′
i
6−ri. It follows that player i reveals his type to all of the other players
if for all k,l ∈ N\{i},
 






   
  ≤ 3,
 





   
  ≤ 4, and |bi − bk| ≤ 5. (5)
Similarly, player i reveals his type only to players in {j,k}   N\{i} if
 





   
  ≤ 3, and |bi − bj|,|bi − bk| ≤ 3.75. (6)
Finally, player i reveals his type only to player j  = i if |bi − bj| ≤ 3. For example, with the bias
proﬁle b = (b1,b2,b3,b4) = (0,3.8,4.8,9), (Ri)i∈N = (∅,{3},{1,2,4},∅) is the most informative13
equilibrium communication network, and is represented in Figure 1.
The informational incentive constraints in this example clearly show that whether communica-
tion is feasible from a given sender to a given receiver depends on the whole set of players to whom
the sender reveals his information. More precisely, Proposition 3’s conditions on the proximity
between i’s bias and the average bias of the strict subsets R′
i   Ri of receivers become weaker as
the set of all receivers, Ri, increases. This eﬀect, which we call the mutual discipline of coordina-
tion, becomes even stronger as α increases. The intuition is that when the set of receivers and the
coordination motive become larger, any deviation in the communication stage to a strict subset of
the receivers generate higher coordination costs, as this deviation will miscoordinate the actions of
players in that strict subset with the other receivers towards whom the sender does not deviate.
This eﬀect is absent in the one sender – two receivers model of Farrell and Gibbons (1989), in which








i), which is always negative.
13That is, it is more informative than every other equilibrium network. Such an equilibrium does not always exist,
as shown in the next section.
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Figure 1: An equilibrium communication network in the Four-player example when b =
(0,3.8,4.8,9).
the payoﬀ of each decision-maker only depends on his own action, while in our model players want
to coordinate their actions. As an illustration, consider the bias proﬁle b = (−4.1,0,3.8,4.1) in the
previous four-player example. There is then an equilibrium in which player 2 reveals his type to
all players in R2 = {1,3,4}, but there is no equilibrium in which he reveals his information to any
strict subset of R2 only.
4.4 General Features of Equilibrium Sets of Receivers
Since informational incentive constraints between two agents depend not only on the conﬂict of
interest between these two agents, but also on their conﬂict of interest with respect to the other
agents with whom they communicate, the structure of the set of equilibrium communication net-
works may be fairly complex. However, by taking a closer look at the way in which the informational
incentive constraints given in Proposition 3 intersect, some general features of the equilibrium sets
of receivers can be deduced. First, we can always construct larger equilibrium sets of receivers by
adding agents whose biases are closer to the sender’s bias than to those of any of his receivers.
Corollary 2 If there exists an equilibrium network in which player i’s set of receivers is Ri, then
there also exists an equilibrium network in which player i’s set of receivers is Ri ∪ {j} for every
player j whose bias is closer to i’s bias than to those of any player in Ri, i.e.,
|bi − bj| ≤ |bi − bk|, ∀ k ∈ Ri. (7)
Proof. See Appendix 7.5.
In particular, the above corollary implies that, for every player i, there always exists an equi-
librium communication network in which his set of receivers Ri includes all the players with the
same bias bi. Note that if condition (7) holds only for some players in Ri, but not for all of them,
then the result may not hold. To see this, consider again the four-player example with the bias
proﬁle b = (0,2.2,3.2,3.7). In this case, there is an equilibrium in which player 1’s set of receivers
is R1 = {2,4} but no equilibrium in which it is {2,3,4}.
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9Second, it is obvious from Proposition 3 that the existence of an equilibrium network in which
player i’s set of receivers is {j}, with j > i, implies the existence of an equilibrium in which his set
of receivers is {k}, for every k between i and j. Applying the previous corollary, this yields:
Corollary 3 If there exists an equilibrium network in which player i’s set of receivers is {j},
then there also exists an equilibrium network in which player i’s set of receivers is Ri for every
Ri ⊆ {i + 1,...,j}.
Proof. Directly from Proposition 3 and Corollary 2.
Note that if players i and j have the same value of private information, i.e. ¯ si − si = ¯ sj − sj,
and if there is an equilibrium network in which player i’s set of receivers is {j}, then there is also
an equilibrium network in which player j’s set of receivers is {i}. Combined with the previous
corollary, this reciprocity property implies that if all players in {i,...,j} have the same value of
private information, then any communication among these players is possible in equilibrium. In
particular, full revelation of information between all of the players in {i,...,j} is an equilibrium.
5 Maximal Equilibrium Communication Networks
In this section, we focus on maximal equilibrium communication networks. An equilibrium com-
munication network R is said to be maximal if there exists no equilibrium communication network
that is more informative than R. For instance, the equilibrium communication network in Figure 1
is the unique maximal network in the example as it is more informative than every other equi-
librium network. We ﬁrst provide conditions for the complete, most informative, communication
network to be an equilibrium. In the case that it is not, we show how our model can generate a
multiplicity of maximal equilibrium networks. Finally, maximal equilibrium networks are analyzed
for two particular distributions of biases.
5.1 The Complete Network
Obviously, if the complete communication network is an equilibrium, then it is the unique maximal
equilibrium network. From the equilibrium characterization of Proposition 3 we directly obtain
the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for this network to be an equilibrium. When all players
have the same value of private information, the set of these conditions is reduced, since we only
have to check that the incentive constraints are satisﬁed for the two extreme players (player 1 and
player n). More precisely:
Corollary 4 The complete communication network is an equilibrium network if and only if for all
i ∈ N and Ri ⊆ N\{i},
 






   
  ≤
(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − αri)
2(n − 1)
2(1 − α)
(si − si). (8)
When each player has the same value of private information, i.e. ¯ si−si = ¯ sj−sj for every i,j ∈ N,
the complete communication network is an equilibrium network if and only if these conditions are
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9satisﬁed for i = 1 and i = n.
Proof. Directly from Proposition 3.
Note that a simple suﬃcient condition for the complete network to be an equilibrium is that
there exist an equilibrium network in which player 1’s set of receivers is R1 = {n} and player n’s
set of receivers is Rn = {1}.
5.2 Multiplicity of Maximal Equilibrium Networks
If larger equilibrium sets of receivers can be constructed by forming the union of existing equilibrium
sets, then there would result a unique maximal equilibrium communication network. As stated in
the following corollary, combining two equilibrium sets of receivers Ri and ˜ Ri for player i yields an
equilibrium set of receivers Ri∪ ˜ Ri for player i if Ri and ˜ Ri do not overlap, i.e. Ri∩ ˜ Ri = ∅. Hence,
in this case, it cannot hold that Ri or ˜ Ri be a set of receivers for player i in a maximal equilibrium
network.
Corollary 5 If there is an equilibrium network in which player i’s set of receivers is Ri, and an
equilibrium network in which player i’s set of receivers is ˜ Ri, and if Ri and ˜ Ri do not overlap, then
there is also an equilibrium network in which player i’s set of receivers is Ri ∪ ˜ Ri.
Proof. See Appendix 7.5.
More generally, the proof of the corollary reveals that a suﬃcient condition for the result to hold
is that the distance between i’s bias and the average bias in Ri ∪ ˜ Ri be smaller than the distance
between i’s bias and the average bias in Ri or ˜ Ri. When this condition does not hold, the union
of the two equilibrium receiver sets does not necessarily yield another equilibrium receiver set. To
see this, consider once more the four-player example with the bias proﬁle b = (0,2.2,3.2,3.7) from
Subsection 4.4. Here, there is an equilibrium network in which player i = 1’s set of receivers is
R1 = {2,3} and an equilibrium network in which it is ˜ R1 = {2,4}, but no equilibrium network
in which player 1’s set of receivers is R1 ∪ ˜ R1 = {2,3,4}. This implies that maximal equilibrium
networks are not necessarily unique.
5.3 Information Revelation for Two Particular Distributions of Biases
We can derive further general results on communication in the maximal networks for two particular
distributions of biases. We ﬁrst consider uniformly-distributed biases, i.e., bi+1 − bi = β ≥ 0 for
every i ∈ N. From Corollary 1 (iii) we know that in maximal equilibrium networks the number of
receivers of every player falls with β. That is, communication decreases as the distance between
all players increases. In addition, we have:
Corollary 6 (Uniformly-Distributed Biases) When players’ biases are uniformly distributed
and each player has the same value of private information, then in the maximal equilibrium networks
the number of receivers of a player increases in the proximity of his bias to the average bias in the
population.
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9Proof. Directly from Proposition 3 since, for any size ri of receivers, the average distance
between i’s bias and the average bias of the ri players who are the closest to i falls with the
proximity of i’s bias to the average bias in the population.
We have already noted the tendency of “extremists” (i.e. players whose biases are far from the
average bias in the population) to communicate less than do middle-biased players (i.e. players
whose biases are close to the average bias in the population) in the second part of Corollary 4.
Indeed, we saw that the full revelation of information between all players is possible whenever the
two extreme players reveal their information to all of the other players. With uniformly-distributed
biases, a stronger statement can be made, since the previous corollary states that middle-biased
players always communicate more than do extremists in the maximal equilibrium networks. In
particular, a central player may reveal his information to all players, while an extreme player may
transmit his information to no-one.
Finally, we consider a two-spike biases situation in which the players are divided up into two
groups, namely L = {1,...,l} and M = {l + 1,...,n}. Players in the ﬁrst group have bias bL and
players in the second group have bias bM, with bM − bL = β > 0. From Corollary 1 (iii) we know
that the number of receivers of every player falls with β. Corollary 2 also implies that the full
revelation of information amongst all players in the same group is always an equilibrium, and that
if a player i ∈ L (i ∈ M, resp.) transmits his information to players in Ri in equilibrium, then there
is also an equilibrium in which i reveals his information to players in Ri ∪ (L\{i}) (Ri ∪ (M\{i}),
resp.). Hence, there is a unique maximal equilibrium network, such that the set of receivers of each
player i ∈ L includes all players in L\{i} and the set of receivers of each player i ∈ M includes all
players in M\{i}.
Since it is always possible for players to communicate to players with the same bias, and since
informational incentive constraints become weaker as the total number of receivers increases (due
to the mutual discipline eﬀect of coordination), it is easy to show that in the maximal equilibrium
network a player’s informational incentive constraints are relaxed as the relative number of players
with the same bias increases. That is, the possible communication links that a player can have
with all players increases as the relative number of players close to him (in his group) increases.
More precisely:
Corollary 7 (Two-Spike Biases) In the maximal equilibrium network with two-spike biases, a
player’s set of receivers increases, and includes more players from the other group, as the relative
number of players in his own group increases.
Proof. Directly from Proposition 3 and the observations above.
In particular, this corollary implies that intergroup information transmission is higher for players
in the larger group than for players in the smaller group when all players have the same value of
private information. Unfortunately, this does not extend to more than two groups of players. For
example, in the four-player example, when α = 0.9 and ¯ si − si = 1 for all i, the condition for
player i to reveal his information to all players is
   




   
    ≤ 0.65,
   
   bi −
bk + bl
2
   
    ≤ 2.6, and |bi − bk| ≤ 4.55. (9)
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9Hence, when b = (−3,0,0,3) there is an equilibrium in which players with zero bias transmit their
information to all of the other players, but the ﬁrst inequality does not hold when b = (0,0,0,3).
Actually, when there are more than two groups of players with the same bias, the corollary above
only applies, in general, for players in the two extreme groups, i.e., the group with bias b1 and that
with bias bn.
6 Conclusion
It is now commonly-admitted that much of the information required for economic decision-making is
exchanged in a decentralized way via networks of relationships. However, the literature on network-
formation games has not analyzed whether information is eﬀectively transmitted once a link has
been formed. In this paper, we focus on agents’ incentives to misrepresent their information and
derive the equilibrium networks regarding the informativeness of agents’ communication strategies.
More precisely, we consider a class of economically-relevant coordination games in which information
about a common state of nature is distributed between players. These players choose an action by
trading oﬀ the beneﬁt of it being close to their “ideal action”, depending on both the state and
an idiosyncratic bias, with that of choosing actions which are close to those of other players. We
analyze the way in which preference heterogeneity aﬀects the strategic information transmission
that occurs before decisions are taken in this setting. Communication among players is characterized
by a strategic communication network in which a connection is formed from one agent to another
if the former truthfully reveals his private information to the latter. We provide explicit conditions
over the proximity of players’ biases for a communication network to be an equilibrium of the
cheap-talk extension of the game. The main result is that an agent will reveal his information to
a group of agents as long as this group is large enough and his ideal action is close enough to the
average ideal action of every subset of agents in this group.
Related Literature. When individuals diﬀer only in terms of knowledge, but not in prefer-
ences, the way in which coordination and welfare is aﬀected by the information structure, and in
particular by the public or private nature of individuals’ signals is theoretically well-established
(see, for example, Morris and Shin, 2002 and Angeletos and Pavan, 2007). The most eﬃcient way
to disseminate information about fundamentals can therefore be analyzed. When agents’ goals
are aligned, but there are physical or cost constraints on the number of communication links be-
tween agents, another literature has identiﬁed the most eﬃcient communication structures. This
problem has been analyzed in diﬀerent settings in team theory and coordination games with incom-
plete information by, amongst others, Marschak and Radner (1972), Radner (1993), Jehiel (1999),
Chwe (2000), Calv´ o-Armengol and Mart´ ı (2007, 2009), and Morris and Shin (2007). A common
feature of these papers is that there is no conﬂict of interest between agents regarding the ideal
state-contingent action proﬁle. Consequently, eﬃcient networks are characterized under physical
communication constraints, while our approach concerns the equilibrium communication networks
that arise under strategic communication constraints.
Since cheap-talk communication is oﬀered to players before they take their decisions, our paper is
methodologically related to the literature on strategic information transmission based on Crawford
and Sobel (1982). Our model includes multiple and interdependent decision-makers, all of whom
17








































9are endowed with private information, whereas most extensions of Crawford and Sobel’s sender-
receiver game with more than two players involve multiple senders (with no decision) but only one
uninformed receiver.14 Exceptions in the literature on cheap talk with multiple receivers (but only
one informed sender) are the paper by Farrell and Gibbons (1989) and the economic applications
noted by, for example, Levy and Razin (2004).15 In Farrell and Gibbons’s (1989) framework, the
main question addressed is whether it makes a diﬀerence whether private or public messages are
sent to the receivers. Farrell and Gibbons illustrate a situation, called the mutual discipline of public
communication, in which information is revealed to neither decision-maker when communication
is private, but a fully-revealing equilibrium is played when communication takes place publicly.
Contrary to Farrell and Gibbons (1989), the receivers we consider are not independent decision-
makers whose actions are separable in the sender’s utility function. This enables us to identify a
mutual discipline eﬀect of coordination which is absent in this literature.
Two recent papers are closely-related to the present work in that they consider incentive conﬂicts
over decisions and therefore endogenize communication between agents. Alonso et al. (2008) and
Rantakari (2008) both analyze strategic communication in a two-division organization in which the
decisions of the divisions are both responsive to local speciﬁcities and coordinated with each other.
Decision-makers’ payoﬀs are similar to those we consider, but the conﬂicts of interest regarding
decisions are modeled diﬀerently. In Alonso et al. (2008) and Rantakari (2008), each division
manager has an ideal action that depends on an idiosyncratic state, and maximizes a weighted sum
of his own division’s proﬁt and that of the other division. The focus is on determining the best
organizational arrangement as a function of these biases and the relative importance of the need
for coordination.
7 Appendix
7.1 Second-Stage Equilibrium Characterization
We ﬁrst characterize the unique equilibrium action proﬁle under complete information. The utility
function of player i (see Equation (1)) can be rewritten as (minus a constant):
ai














The best response of each player i to a−i is given by:






If ai is a best response to a−i, then it follows from Equations (10) and (11) that player i’s utility
14For example, Battaglini (2002), Krishna and Morgan (2001), Ambrus and Takahashi (2008), and Morgan and
Stocken (2008).
15Of course, a number of game-theoretical, but more abstract, papers deal with general cheap-talk games, but the
focus is mainly on characterizing conditions under which a (mediated) communication equilibrium can be decentralized
via multilateral and multistage communication (see the references in Forges, 2007).
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9takes the following simple form (minus a constant):



































... ... − α
(n−1)
− α














(1 − α)(θ + b1)
. . .
. . .





























Therefore, when every player knows the state of nature, equilibrium actions are given by:
ai(θ) = θ +
[(n − 1) − (n − 2)α]bi + α
 
j =ibj
n + α − 1
≡ θ + Bi, for every i ∈ N. (13)
Since players’ best responses are linear, exactly the same algebra shows that, under incomplete
information, and whatever the information structure generated by the communication strategy
proﬁle, expected equilibrium actions are uniquely characterized by
E(ai) = E(θ) + Bi, for every i ∈ N. (14)
The uniqueness of the linear equilibrium identiﬁed in (2) is proved as in Calv´ o-Armengol and
Mart´ ı (2009, Theorem 1). We deﬁne the following payoﬀ function:
v(a1,...,an;s) = −(1 − α)
 
i∈N










The set of equilibria of our second-stage coordination game is the same as that in the corre-
sponding Bayesian game with identical agent preferences in which every player’s payoﬀ function is
given by (15), as the best responses are identical in both games.
Theorem 4 of Marschak and Radner (1972)[167–168] provides a suﬃcient condition for the
equilibrium of a Bayesian game with identical agent preferences to be determined uniquely by a
system of linear equations when the set of states of the world is ﬁnite and payoﬀ functions are given
by:
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where the λ, µi and vij are all real-valued functions of the state of the world, s ∈ S. It is easily
checked that the payoﬀ function (15) can be written as (16), with
λ(s) = −(1 − α)
 
i∈N
(θ(s) + bi)2 ,
µi(s) = (1 − α)(θ(s) + bi) ,
vii(s) = vii = 1 ,




The suﬃcient condition in Theorem 4 of Marschak and Radner (1972) then boils down to the
n-square matrix of cross-derivatives [vij]i,j∈N being positive deﬁnite. The determinant of [vij]i,j∈N
is:  
   
   
 
   
   
1 − α
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n−1
− α
n−1     − α
n−1 1
 
   
   
 
   
   
= (1 − α)
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0     0 1 + α
n−1
 
   
   
 
   
   




The ﬁrst equality results from the replacement of the elements in the ﬁrst column by the row
sum, and then taking out the common factor (1−α). The second equality is obtained by subtracting
the ﬁrst row from every other row. We are left with an upper triangular matrix whose determinant
is just the product of the diagonal term, which is positive. Similarly, we deduce that the leading
principal minors of [vij]i,j∈N are positive. The matrix [vij]i,j∈N is thus positive deﬁnite.
Next, by explicitly solving some particular incomplete-information situations as above, it is
possible to guess the general form of the unique second-stage equilibrium actions. To check that
the solution given by Equation (2) is indeed the equilibrium when the communication strategy
proﬁle is characterized by (Ri)i∈N, ﬁx some player l ∈ N and suppose that the second-stage
equilibrium action of every player i  = l is given by Equation (2). We then show that player l’s best
response to this proﬁle of second-stage actions (ai)i =l is also of the form of Equation (2).
After the communication stage, for all i ∈ N, recall that Ii = {k : i ∈ Rk} ∪ {i} is the set of
players whose signals are known by player i, Ii = {k : i  ∈ Rk}\{i} the set of players whose signals
are not known by player i, and let Ei( ) = E(  | {sk : k ∈ Ii}) be player i’s expectation operator
conditional on the set of signals that he knows.
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(al − ai)2 
, (17)
so his best response is given by:
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Every signal sj known by player l is known by rj players other than l and not known by n−1−rj
players diﬀerent from l; every signal sj not known by player l is known by rj +1 players other than
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α(n − 1)bl + (n − 1)
 
i =l bi
n + α − 1
. (21)
Plugging (21) and (20) into (18) and simplifying, we obtain player l’s optimal action, which
takes exactly the same form as that in Equation (2).
7.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The ex ante equilibrium payoﬀ of player j ∈ N is given by:
Uj = −(1 − α)V ar(aj −
 
i∈N















It follows from (14) that E(aj) =
 
i∈N E(si) + Bj, so we have:














We consider two communication networks R = (Rk)k∈N and R′ = (R′
k)k∈N such that Ri  = R′
i
and Rk = R′
k for all k ∈ N\{i}. That is, R and R′ are identical except that player i has a diﬀerent
set of receivers in R′. Player i is ﬁxed throughout the analysis. The ex ante equilibrium payoﬀ of
every player j ∈ N with the communication network R (R′, resp.) is denoted by Uj (U′
j, resp.).
Given the communication network R (R′, resp.), the second-stage equilibrium action of every player
j ∈ N is denoted by aj (a′
j, resp.). For all j ∈ N, given a strategic communication network R (R′,
resp.), let Ij = {k : j ∈ Rk} ∪ {j} (I′
j = {k : j ∈ R′
k} ∪ {j}, resp.) denote the set of players whose
signals are known by player j, and Ij = {k : j  ∈ Rk}\{j} (I′
j = {k : j  ∈ R′
k}\{j}, resp.) the set
of players whose signals are not known by player j.
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V ar(sl) + 1[i ∈ Ij]
 
α(n − 1 − ri)
n − 1 − αri
 2
V ar(si)
+ 1[i ∈ Ij] V ar(si),
where 1[i ∈ Ij] is an indicator function that equals 1 when player j knows the signal si, and 1[i ∈ Ij]
is an indicator function that equals 1 when player j does not know the signal si. A similar equation
holds for V ar(a′
j −
 
i∈N si), when the communication network is R′.
The two communication networks R and R′ that we consider are such that Ij\{i} = I′
j\{i} and
Ij\{i} = I′





si) − V ar(aj −
 
i∈N





α(n − 1 − r′
i)
n − 1 − αr′
i
 2
+ 1[i ∈ I′
j] − 1[i ∈ Ij]
 
α(n − 1 − ri)
n − 1 − αri
 2




When the communication network is R, for all j ∈ N and m  = j, we have, from (2):
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(1 − α)(n − 1)
n − 1 − αri
 2  
1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im] + 1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im]
 
V ar(si).
A similar equation holds for V ar(a′
j − a′
m) when the communication network is R′.
The two communication networks R and R′ are such that (Ij ∩ Im)\{i} = (I′
j ∩ I′
m)\{i} and
(Ij ∩ Im)\{i} = (I′
j ∩ I′
m)\{i}, so for all j ∈ N and m  = j we have:
V ar(a′
j − a′
m) − V ar(aj − am)




m] + 1[i ∈ I′
j ∩ I′
m]
(n − 1 − αr′
i)2 −
1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im] + 1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im]




















































α(n − 1 − r′
i)
n − 1 − αr′
i
 2
+ 1[i ∈ I′
j] − 1[i ∈ Ij]
 
α(n − 1 − ri)
n − 1 − αri
 2
− 1[i ∈ Ij]






m] + 1[i ∈ I′
j ∩ I′
m]
(n − 1 − αr′
i)2 −
1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im] + 1[i ∈ Ij ∩ Im]




We next focus on the particular case in which Ri   R′
i and let K = R′
i\Ri be the set of agents
who belong to R′
i but not to Ri. The set K is ﬁxed throughout the analysis, and |K| = k ≥ 1.
Let |Ri| = ri and |R′
i| = r′
i = ri + k. To evaluate the sign of Uj − U′
j, in order to establish who is
better oﬀ and who is worse oﬀ under the diﬀerent networks, we distinguish four types of players,
as below:
• (i) Players who belong both to Ri and to R′
i. For every such player j ∈ Ri = R′
i\K, we have
i ∈ Ij and i ∈ I′
j.
• (ii) Players other than player i who belong neither to Ri nor to R′
i. For every such player
j ∈ N\(R′
i ∪ {i}) = N\(Ri ∪ K ∪ {i}), we have i ∈ Ij and i ∈ I′
j.
• (iii) Players who belong to R′
i but not to Ri. For every such player j ∈ K = R′
i\Ri, we have
i ∈ I′
j and i ∈ Ij.
• (iv) Player i, for whom we have i ∈ Ii and i ∈ I′
i.
(i) For every player j ∈ Ri = R′
i\K, the set of players other than j can be divided into three
disjoint sets of players: {i} ∪ (R′
i\(K ∪ {j})), N\(R′
i ∪ {i}) and K. We have:
• for every player m ∈ {i} ∪ (R′
i\(K ∪ {j})), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I′
m;
• for every player m ∈ N\(R′
i ∪ {i}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I′
m, and we have |N\(R′
i ∪ {i})| =
n − 1 − r′
i = n − 1 − ri − k;
• for every player m ∈ K, i ∈ Im but i ∈ I′
m.
Since i ∈ Ij and i ∈ I′
j, Equation (25) simpliﬁes to:
Uj − U′
j = α(1 − α)
 
n − 1 − r′
i
n − 1 − αr′
i
−
n − 1 − ri











V ar(si) < 0. Hence, for all
j ∈ R′
i\K, we have Uj < U′
j.
(ii) For every player j ∈ N\(R′
i ∪ {i}) = N\(Ri ∪ K ∪ {i}), the set of players other than j can
be divided into three disjoint sets of players: {i} ∪ (R′
i\K), N\(R′
i ∪ {i,j}) and K. We have:
24








































9• for every player m ∈ {i}∪(R′
i\K), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I′
m, and we have |{i}∪(R′
i\K)| = ri +1 =
r′
i − k + 1;
• for every player m ∈ N\(R′
i ∪ {i,j}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I′
m;
• for every player m ∈ K, i ∈ Im but i ∈ I′
m.
Since i ∈ Ij and i ∈ I′
j, Equation (25) simpliﬁes to:
Uj − U′




(n − 1 − αr′
i)2 −
ri + 1












> 0. Hence, for all j ∈ N\(R′
i ∪ {i}), we have
Uj > U′
j.
(iii) For every player j ∈ K = R′
i\Ri, the set of players other than j can be divided into three
disjoint sets of players: {i} ∪ (R′
i\K), N\(R′
i ∪ {i}) and K\{j}. We have:
• for every player m ∈ {i} ∪ (R′
i\K), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I′
m, and we have |{i} ∪ (R′
i\K)| = ri + 1;
• for every player m ∈ N\(R′
i∪{i}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I′
m, and we have |N\(R′
i∪{i})| = n−1−r′
i;
• for every player m ∈ K\{j}, i ∈ Im but i ∈ I′
m.
Since i ∈ Ij and i ∈ I′
j, Equation (25) simpliﬁes to:
Uj − U′
j = −(1 − α)2(n − 1)
 
1
n − 1 − αr′
i
+
α (ri + 1)
(n − 1 − αri)2
 
V ar(si) < 0. (28)
Hence, for all player j ∈ K, we have Uj < U′
j.
(iv) The set of players other than i can be divided into three disjoint sets of players: R′
i\K,
N\(R′
i ∪ {i}) and K. We have:
• for every player m ∈ R′
i\K, i ∈ Im and i ∈ I′
m;
• for every player m ∈ N\(R′
i ∪ {i}), i ∈ Im and i ∈ I′
m;
• for every player m ∈ K, i ∈ Im but i ∈ I′
m.
Since i ∈ Ii and i ∈ I′
i, Equation (25) yields exactly the same diﬀerence as Equation (26). Hence,
for player i such that Ri   R′
i, we have Ui < U′
i. This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
7.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Consider two communication networks R = (Ri,R−i) and R′ = (R′
i,R−i), such that r′
i > ri and
|Ri ∩ R′
i| = r. Ex ante expected welfare is the sum of ex ante expected utilities. When the
25


































































i, and that for all j ∈ (Ri∩R′
i), Uj −U′
j = Ui−U′
i, the diﬀerence W −W′
can be written as:




















We have |{i} ∪ (Ri ∩ R′
i)| = r + 1, |R′
i\Ri| = r′
i − r, |Ri\R′
i| = ri − r and |N\(Ri ∪ R′
i ∪ {i})| =
n − (1 + ri + r′
i − r). Next, using Equation (25) in the same way as in the proof of Proposition 1,
we obtain:
W − W′ = α(1 − α)(r + 1)
 
n − 1 − r′
i
n − 1 − αr′
i
−
n − 1 − ri
n − 1 − αri
 
V ar(si)





(n − 1 − αr′
i)2 −
ri + 1
(n − 1 − αri)2
 
V ar(si)




n − 1 − αr′
i
+
α (ri + 1)
(n − 1 − αri)2
 
V ar(si)
+ (1 − α)2(n − 1)(ri − r)
 
1








After some simpliﬁcation, we have W − W′ =
−
(1 − α)3(n − 1)2V ar(si)
(n − 1 − αr′
i)2(n − 1 − αri)2




i (1 + r′
i) − r′2
i (1 + ri)) + 2α(n − 1)(r′
i − ri) + (n − 1)2(r′
i − ri)
 
      
x
.
Solving x = 0 in α yields the following discriminant: 4(n−1)2(r′
i−ri)2(1+ri)(1+r′
i) ≥ 0. We have













From ri ≥ 1 and r′
i ≥ 2, we deduce that α1 < 0. From ri ≤ n− 2 and r′
i ≤ n −1, and the fact that
α2 is decreasing in ri and r′
i, we deduce that α2 > 1. Since α ∈ (0,1), x is always strictly positive.
Hence, W < W′.
26








































97.4 Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an equilibrium of the private-communication game in which each player i reveals his type
to players in Ri ⊆ N\{i}. Without loss of generality, assume that each player i sends to every
player j ∈ Ri the message m
j
i = m when his type is si and the message m
j
i = m when his type
is si, and sends the same message whatever his type to players outside Ri. Given (Ri)i∈N, the
second-stage equilibrium actions are given by (2).
Without loss of generality, we look for the conditions under which player 1 does not deviate from
his equilibrium communication strategy described above. First, assume that player 1’s true type is





α(n − 1 − rj)E(sj) + (1 − α)(n − 1)sj






α(n − 1 − r1)E(s1) + (1 − α)(n − 1)s1
n − 1 − αr1
, (29)




α(n − 1 − rj)E(sj) + (1 − α)(n − 1)sj




E(sj) + Bi + E(s1). (30)
The relevant deviations for player 1 in the communication stage consist in lying to a subset of
players M ⊆ R1, i.e. sending message m instead of m to players in M (and not deviating towards
the other players).16 Let m = |M|, and denote by (a′
i)i∈N the proﬁle of players’ actions after this
deviation. Every player i ∈ M chooses action a′
i = ai, which is given by replacing s1 by s1 in (29).
The action a′
i of every player i ∈ N\(M ∪ {1}) is the same as that in the original equilibrium.
Player 1’s optimal action in the second stage is obtained from the best response of Equation (18)
to (a′
i)i =1, and takes the following form:
a′

















16In equilibrium, any message oﬀ of the equilibrium path is interpreted as exactly m or m.
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α(n − 1 − rj)E(sj)





α(n − 1 − rj)E(sj)





(1 − α)(n − 1)sj
n − 1 − αrj
+
m(1 − α)(n − 1)s1
n − 1 − αr1
+
(r1 − m)(1 − α)(n − 1)s1





(1 − α)(n − 1)E(sj)




(n − 1 − rj)E(sj) +
 
j∈I1









α(n − 1 − rj)E(sj) + (1 − α)(n − 1)sj






αm(1 − α)s1 + (n − 1 − αm)(1 − α)s1 + α(n − 1 − r1)E(s1)
n − 1 − αr1
+ B1. (33)
We denote by V1 the expected payoﬀ of player 1 conditional on signal s1 under the original
equilibrium, and by V ′
1 his expected payoﬀ conditional on signal s1 when he deviates by lying to
players in M (and thus plays action a′
1 in the second-stage game). Player 1 does not deviate by
lying to players in M if V ′
1 − V1 ≤ 0. We have:
V ′



















(a1 − ai)2 − (a′







(a1 − ai)2 − (a′







(a1 − ai)2 − (a′




For the sake of simplicity, we examine separately the elements of the diﬀerence V ′
1 −V1 and use




(1 − α)(n − 1)(sj − E(sj))




(1 − α)(n − 1)(E(sj) − sj)
n − 1 − αrj
+ B1 − Bi.





(a1 − ai)2 − (a′











(1 − α)(n − 1 − αm)(s1 − s1)
n − 1 − αr1
 2 
   





(1 − α)(n − 1 − αm)(s1 − s1)
n − 1 − αr1
   
i∈M
(B1 − Bi) − m
 
(1 − α)(n − 1 − αm)(s1 − s1)
















































(a1 − ai)2 − (a′











(1 − α)αm(s1 − s1)
n − 1 − αr1
 2 
   





(1 − α)αm(s1 − s1)
n − 1 − αr1
   
i∈R1\M
(B1 − Bi) − (r1 − m)
 
(1 − α)αm(s1 − s1)







(a1 − ai)2 − (a′








(1 − α)(n − 1)(s1 − E(s1))





(1 − α)αms1 + (1 − α)(n − 1 − αm)s1 − (1 − α)(n − 1)E(s1)
n − 1 − αr1
 2 
   





(1 − α)αm(s1 − s1)
n − 1 − αr1
   
i∈N\(R1∪{1})
(B1 − Bi) + (n − 1 − r1)
 
(1 − α)(n − 1)(s1 − E(s1))
n − 1 − αr1
 2
− (n − 1 − r1)
 
(1 − α)αms1 + (1 − α)(n − 1 − αm)s1 − (1 − α)(n − 1)E(s1)




¯ a1 − a′
1 =
(1 − α)αm(s1 − s1)








α(n − r1 − 1)E(s1) + (1 − α)(n − 1)s1




αm(1 − α)s1 + (n − 1 − αm)(1 − α)s1 + α(n − r1 − 1)E(s1)







α(n − rj − 1)E(sj) + (1 − α)(n − 1)sj








(1 − α)αm(s1 − s1)














   
 


















si + s1 + b1)
 
   







α(n − r1 − 1)E(s1) + (1 − α)(n − 1)s1
n − 1 − αr1
 2
+ 2(B1 − b1 − s1)
 
(1 − α)αm(s1 − s1)




αm(1 − α)s1 + (n − 1 − αm)(1 − α)s1 + α(n − r1 − 1)E(s1)
n − 1 − αr1
 2
. (37)
Next, we plug (34), (35), (36) and (37) into V ′
1 − V1 and simplify. To simplify the part of the
29









































1 − V1 that deals with biases, note that:
B1 − Bi =
(1 − α)(n − 1)(b1 − bi)
n + α − 1
and B1 − b1 =
−α(n − 1)b1 + α
 
j =1 bj
n + α − 1
.
Finally, simple but tedious calculus yields:
V ′
1 − V1 =
2α(1 − α)2(n − 1)(s1 − s1)







α(1 − α)2m(n − 1 − αm)(s1 − s1)2
(n − 1 − αr1)2 .
Hence, in the private-communication game, player 1 of type s1 = s1 does not deviate by lying to
players in M ⊆ R1 if V ′









(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − αm)
2(n − 1)(n − 1 − αr1)
(s1 − s1). (38)
Applying the same reasoning, player 1 of type s1 = s1 has no proﬁtable deviation if, for all






(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − αm)
2(n − 1)(n − 1 − αr1)
(s1 − s1). (39)
Condition (4) is obtained from (38) and (39).
7.5 Other Proofs
Proof of Corollary 2. We have to show that for every R′′
i ⊆ Ri ∪ {j} we have:
 
 










   
 
≤
(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − αr′′
i )
2(n − 1)(n − 1 − α(ri + 1))
(si − si). (40)
If j / ∈ R′′
i , then (4) clearly implies (40), because the LHS are the same in both inequalities, but the
RHS is larger in (40). Now, let R′′
i = R′
i ∪{j} for some R′
i ⊆ Ri. By (7), the LHS of (40) is smaller
than the LHS of (4). Since r′′
i = r′
i + 1, it remains for us to check that the RHS of (40) is larger
than the RHS of (4), i.e.:
n − 1 − α(r′
i + 1)
n − 1 − α(ri + 1)
≥
n − 1 − αr′
i
n − 1 − αri
⇐⇒ α2(ri − r′
i) ≥ 0,
which is satisﬁed since ri ≥ r′
i.
Proof of Corollary 5. Let Ti = Ri ∪ ˜ Ri. For T′
i ⊆ Ti, let R′
i ⊆ Ri and ˜ R′
i ⊆ ˜ Ri be such that
T′
i = R′
i ∪ ˜ R′
i. Since Ri and ˜ Ri do not overlap, we have:
 
 





















































































9Since Ri and ˜ Ri are equilibrium sets of receivers, Proposition 3 implies:
   








   




(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − αr′
i)
2(n − 1)(n − 1 − αri)
(si − si),
(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − α˜ r′
i)





(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − α(r′
i + ˜ ri))
2(n − 1)(n − 1 − α(ri + ˜ ri))
(si − si),
(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − α(˜ r′
i + ri))




(n − 1 + α)(n − 1 − αt′i)
2(n − 1)(n − 1 − αti)
(si − si),
where the last inequality comes from r′
i + ˜ ri ≥ t′
i and ˜ r′
i +ri ≥ t′
i. Hence, by Proposition 3, Ri ∪ ˜ Ri
is an equilibrium set of receivers for player i.
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